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4 
1 Introduction 
This paper studies the relation between firms’ social capital and trust, as a measure of corporate social 
responsibility (CSR), and stock market returns in Europe during the financial crisis 2008-2009. High-CSR 
firms yielded significantly higher stock returns (excess of 7.18% raw crisis-period return and 6.30% abnormal 
crisis-period return) compared to low-CSR firms over the six-month period from August 2008 to February 
2009. I also show that regional and industry trust are strongly positively related to firm’s CSR activities and 
excess crisis-period returns, and that the effectiveness of CSR activities on excess returns varies substantially 
across the Europe and industries. The results are robust for controlling numerous firm characteristics, an 
alternative crisis-period, and different measurement dates for CSR. To illustrate the economic significance of 
the findings, the positive effect of firm’s cash holdings or profitability, the variables of which previous studies 
have shown to have affected returns, was only three fifths of CSR’s equivalent. 
The results are mainly consistent with those of Lins, Servaes, Tamayo (2016) that first discovered the 
phenomenon from the U.S. market during the financial crisis. However, I find that some elements of CSR are 
more than important others, as results suggest that external stakeholder activities targeted to environmental 
issues were the most essential aspects to build trust and create shareholder value during the crisis. These 
findings contribute to current CSR literature that broadens the focus beyond traditional explanatory variables 
on stock returns, to social capital and overall trust, especially at time of crisis when trust in most needed. 
 
1.1 Literature review 
Concepts of social capital and trust are broadly defined in the literature due to their abstract nature. 
Arrow (1972) argue that “virtually every commercial transaction has within itself an element of trust”, which 
only underlines the importance of trust in the economics and finance, and ultimately in this topic. Gambetta 
(1988) defines trust as “the expectation that another person will perform actions that are beneficial, or at least 
not detrimental, to us regardless of our capacity to monitor those actions ... so that we will consider cooperating 
with him”. Correspondingly, Putnam (1993) defines social capital as “a propensity of people in a society to 
cooperate to produce socially efﬁcient outcomes”. 
CSR is generally viewed as a social construction, which limits the possibility to develop an unbiased 
definition (Berger and Luckmann, 1966). Dahlsrud (2006) analyzes 37 different definitions of CSR and finds 
that they are consistently referring to five dimensions: voluntariness, stakeholder, social, environmental, and 
economic. Commission of the European Communities (2001) covers all these dimensions and defines CSR as 
“a concept whereby companies integrate social and environmental concerns in their business operations and 
in their interaction with their stakeholders on a voluntary basis”. 
Implication that CSR is an appropriate proxy for social capital is generally approved by practitioners. 
Sacconi and Degli Antoni (2011) suggest that CSR activities are an alternative way of building social capital 
 
5 
in the firm supported by a set of analytical studies. Aoki (2011) approaches the topic through the reciprocity 
principle by arguing that in response to social contributions (i.e. CSR activities) stakeholders may acknowledge 
social recognitions to firms, which ultimately constitutes their social capital. Servaes and Tamayo (2017) argue 
in their review of social capital in corporations that without comprehensive commitment to CSR activities, 
firms are unlikely to build up any social capital. Moreover, persuasion that social capital can be built through 
CSR activities is common among corporate managers as well. CEO surveys conducted by 
PricewaterhouseCoopers (2013, 2014) show that following the crisis, CEOs consider increasing their firms’ 
engagement in CSR activities to restore stakeholder trust. 
However, it is possible that CSR is proxying some other intangible factor I fail to recognize, or the 
results may be biased due to fact that CSR is inexactly defined and thus sensitive for subjective valuation. For 
instance, McWilliams and Siegel (2000) argue that regression models excluding Research and Development 
(R&D) expenses are misspecified and result in upwardly biased estimates of the financial impact of CSR. The 
authors continue and further suggest that controlling for investment in R&D neutralizes the effect of CSR. In 
addition, Nguyen, Nguyen, and Yin (2015) find that better corporate governance mitigated the disruption 
caused by external shock to firms’ financing and investment activities during the financial crisis. To reduce 
the probability of such outcomes that do not represent the effect of CSR, I conduct further robustness tests 
regarding issues discussed above. Moreover, I rely heavily on the existing literature that suggest the conjecture 
of built social capital and trust through CSR activities. 
Associating the definitions of social capital, trust, and CSR to the context of financial crisis, may 
explain the increased demand for stocks of trustworthy firms that drove the prices of such stocks upwards. 
Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2008) demonstrate that “the decision to invest in stocks requires not only an 
assessment of the risk-return trade-off given the existing data, but also an act of faith that the data in our 
possession are reliable and that the overall system is fair”. At so-called normal times, the first part of the 
sentence is undoubtedly emphasized in decision-making. However, events of the financial crisis lead to 
catastrophic collapse in confidence (Stiglitz, 2008), which arguably made investors question the reliability of 
firm-specific information and perhaps the entire financial system. Therefore, the financial crisis provides an 
idealistic framework to examine, how the concepts of social capital and trust affect crisis-period returns in an 
environment featuring ultimate loss of trust and pessimism. 
This paper is inspired by the work of Lins et al. (2016) who study the effect of social capital and trust 
as measured by CSR on corporate performance in the U.S. market during the financial crisis. The authors find 
that high-CSR firms yielded four to seven percentage higher returns than those with low CSR ratings, but also 
outperformed operatively in terms of revenue growth, profitability, and access to debt capital markets during 
the crisis. They argue that this was due to built trust through CSR activities between a firm and its stakeholders 
that pays off when the overall trust declines, as occurred during the financial crisis, describing the social capital 
as an insurance policy for the firm. Lins et al. (2016) also find that CSR activities produce substantial costs for 
firms involving in them. In their sample, high-CSR firms have an average of over $200 million higher annual 
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Selling, General, and Administrative (SG&A) expenses than low-CSR firms, which strengthens the view of 
CSR as an insurance policy. Such findings also imply that even if CSR had insuring effect against negative 
shocks, it could still have negative effect on firm’s value in the long-term. 
Other prior studies have also found evidence of CSR risk-reduction affection. Albuquerque, Koskinen, 
and Zhang (2019) model CSR activities as an investment in customer loyalty and find that CSR activities 
decrease a firm’s systematic risk (i.e. its beta) and thus increase firm value. These findings suggest gentler 
decline of high-CSR stocks when the overall market plummets, as they simply carry less market risk, but also 
create a hypothesis about lower post-crisis returns. Hong and Liskovich (2016) find that high-CSR firms 
receive more lenient settlements in lawsuits, while Minor and Morgan (2011) argue that CSR activities provide 
protection for firm’s reputation against negative events. Overall, these results suggest that CSR activities help 
reduce both systematic and idiosyncratic risk of the firm. 
Evidently, based on the discussion above, prior studies suggest that CSR activities not only lower the 
firm’s risk profile, but also serve as an insurance policy for the firm, through built social capital and trust. 
Therefore, it is fair to assume that high-CSR firms yielded excess returns during the financial crisis, when 
overall trust in the economy sharply declined. 
 
2 Data and Methodology 
2.1 Data Collection 
To construct the sample, I collect information on firms’ CSR ratings from Refinitiv ESG database, 
which contains environmental, social and governance (ESG) ratings of large, publicly traded firms. The 
database covers over 70% of global market cap, across more than 400 different ESG metrics, with history 
going back to 2002. ESG scores from Refinitiv are designed to objectively measure a firm’s relative ESG 
performance, commitment and effectiveness in ten different categories: resource use, emissions, innovation, 
workforce, human rights, community, product responsibility, management, shareholders and CSR strategy. In 
this paper, I focus on five of these categories: resource use, emissions, workforce, human rights and 
community, and construct the CSR variable by using them. As Lins et al. (2016), I exclude innovation and 
product responsibility categories, since they are mainly industry-related and thus considered outside the scope 
of CSR. Finally, I exclude the last three categories as categories under governance are not generally part of a 
firm’s CSR remit (Lins et al. 2016). However, I control governance in further robustness tests. 
Refinitiv reports each ESG category separately as a score from 0 to 100. To compute the overall ESG 
score, each category is weighted by the number of indicators that constitute each category in comparison to all 
indicators used in the Refinitiv ESG Score framework. The higher weight is assigned for categories that are 
more mature in terms of disclosure and transparency, and thus computed with a higher degree of confidence. 
I apply the same formula for category weights in my study when constructing the CSR variable. The category 
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weights differ significantly from each other: workforce 32 %, emissions 24 %, resource use 21 %, community 
15 % and human rights 9 %. Finally, to obtain the primary explanatory variable, a firm’s total weighted CSR 
score, I multiply each category score with the category weights, ending up with CSR score that ranges from 0 
to 1. 
Table 1. ESG Category definitions 
 ESG categories and their definitions focused in this paper to construct CSR variable (Refinitiv, 2019). The number of 
indicators per category determines the weight of the respective category. 
Category Definition No. Indicators Weight 
Resource Use 
Reflects a firm’s performance and capacity to reduce 
the use of materials, energy or water, and to find more 
eco-efficient solutions by improving supply chain 
management.  
19 20.7 % 
Emission 
Measures a firm’s commitment and effectiveness 
towards reducing environmental emissions in the 
production and operational processes.  
22 23.9 % 
Workforce 
Measures a firm’s effectiveness towards job 
satisfaction, a healthy and safe workplace, 
maintaining diversity and equal opportunities and 
development opportunities for its workforce.  
29 31.5 % 
Human Rights 
Measures a firm’s effectiveness towards respecting 
the fundamental human rights conventions.  
8 8.7 % 
Community 
Measures a firm’s commitment towards being a good 
citizen, protecting public health and respecting 
business ethics.  
14 15.2 % 
 
I retrieve the stock price data and accounting data from Datastream and Thomson Reuters Eikon, 
respectively. First, I select public firms that could be either active or inactive by their status to avoid the 
survivorship bias. Second, I choose stocks of which country of exchange is located in Europe. In case of 
multiple stock exchange listings, I pick the stock exchange the firm is headquartered in. Third, I remove 
financial firms that are classified either banks or insurance companies by TRBC Industry Group data. This is 
due to bank bailouts and massive emergency rescue packages given by European governments, that no less 
than 114 European banks received during the years 2007 and 2013 (Gerhardt and Van der Vennet, 2016) 
However, I retain other financials classified by TRBC Economic Sector data, as they are either real estate 
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investment trusts (REITs), investment banks, holding companies, or other financials that were not crucial to 
financial system and thus not under government support at time of the financial crisis. 
I focus to examine the effect of CSR during the financial crisis, which Lins, Volpin, and Wagner 
(2013) define as a period from August 2008 to March 2009. August 2008 preceded the month when Lehman 
Brothers went bankrupt after the Federal Reserve declined to guarantee its loans, while March 2009 was the 
month when major global indices, including STOXX Europe 600 (a broad European stock index), hit its lowest 
level of the crisis. However, stocks already started recovering globally during March 2009, and hence February 
2009 was the month when STOXX Europe 600 saw its lowest monthly close price. Therefore, I exclude March 
2009 from the financial crisis period but control the inclusion of it in further robustness tests. 
The main stock return measures for each firm are the Raw Period Return, which is the raw buy-and-
hold return including possible dividend payments, and the Abnormal Period Return, which is the raw return 
minus the expected return. I compute the expected returns from the market model (MacKinlay, 1997) over 60-
month period ending in July 2008, as a function of local stock market indices. This regression provides me 5-
year monthly beta coefficients for each firm, which I apply to the market model to compute expected returns 
for the crisis period. Finally, I subtract the expected returns from the raw returns resulting in abnormal crisis-
period returns. 
Ultimately, after combining all the data, I obtain a sample of 516 firms, excluding banks and insurance 
companies, with sufficient coverage on ESG data, stock price data, and accounting data from Refinitiv, 
Datastream, and Thomson Reuters Eikon databases, respectively. 
 
2.2 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for main variables of this study as values of median, standard 
deviation, 25th percentile, median, and 75th percentile. The mean value of CSR, which is the primary 
explanatory variable of interest, is 0.579, while the median value is 0.599. Raw Period Return is strongly 
negative, with a mean value of –0.351, and a median value of –0.344, expressing the market turmoil that 
prevailed during the 6-month period from August 2008 to February 2009. Abnormal Period Return is slightly 
positive with a mean value of 0.015, and a median value of 0.013, excluding firm’s systematic risk the market 
model predicts. The sample contains mainly large-cap stocks, which is due to lack of ESG data, and therefore 
market capitalizations of the firms are relatively high, with a median value of $5,630 million, and a minimum 
value of $305 million. Momentum, which is the raw return over the preceding 12-month period of my period 
of interest, is consistently negative, with a mean value of –0.213, and a median value of –0.224, indicating the 
stocks had already experienced major losses before escalation of the crisis. 
Table 3 presents correlation matrix of dependent and explanatory variables. CSR is strongly positively 
correlated with logarithm of market capitalization, with a value of 0.54, indicating larger firms spend more 
effort to their CSR activities. Therefore, it is essential to control firm’s market capitalization to avoid CSR 
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from picking up the effect of it, and to avoid omitted variable bias. Remarkably, CSR is almost zero correlated 
with debt levels, and slightly negatively correlated with cash holdings and profitability. This suggest that CSR 
is not an element of excess investment and output of profitability, excess cash, and financial leeway. 
 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics of the sample. 
The sample consists of 516 firms (excluding banks and insurance firms) with all data available to compute stock returns 
and variables summarized in the table. Accounting data and CSR ratings are computed as of year-end 2007. CSR 
represents a firm’s social responsibility in five different categories (resource use, emissions, workforce, human rights, 
and community). Each category is weighted by the number of indicators that make up each category, resulting in total 
weighted CSR score that ranges from 0 to 1. Raw Period Return is the raw buy-and-hold return including possible 
dividend payments over the period from August 2008 to February 2009. Abnormal Period Return is the raw return minus 
the expected return over the period from August 2008 to February 2009. The expected return is computed using the market 
model over the 60-month period ending in July 2008, as a function of local stock market index. Market capitalization is 
presented in US$ millions. Long-term debt is computed as long-term debt divided by total assets. Short-term debt is 
computed as short-term debt divided by total assets. Cash holdings is computed as cash and short-term investments 
divided by total assets. Profitability is computed as pretax income (to remove the effect of different country tax rates) 
divided by total assets. Book-to-market is computed as book value of equity divided by market value of equity. Negative 
B/M dummy is a dummy variable set equal to 0 if firm’s book-to-market value is positive, and equal to 1 if negative. 
Momentum is the raw return over the period from August 2007 to July 2008. Idiosyncratic risk is computed as the residual 
variance from the market model over the 60-month period ending in July 2008.  
Table 2 Mean Std. Dev  25th perc. Median 75th perc. 
CSR 57.86 20.93 40.23 59.86 75.34 
Raw Period Return –0.351 0.242 –0.531 –0.344 –0.183 
Abnormal Period Return 0.015 0.241 –0.129 0.013 0.153 
Market capitalization 18,476 36,989 2,362 5,630 14,422 
Long-term debt 0.194 0.184 0.069 0.165 0.275 
Short-term debt 0.059 0.078 0.013 0.038 0.077 
Cash holdings 0.113 0.128 0.034 0.073 0.141 
Profitability 0.124 0.113 0.057 0.096 0.159 
Book-to-market 0.492 0.492 0.219 0.361 0.603 
Negative B/M dummy 0.012 0.107 0 0 0 
Momentum –0.213 0.300 –0.412 –0.224 –0.046 
Idiosyncratic risk 0.006 0.005 0.003 0.004 0.007 
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Table 3. Correlation matrix of dependent variables and explanatory variables. 
Table 3 CSR 
Raw 
Return 
Abnormal 
Return 
ln(Mkt 
cap) 
Long-
term debt 
Short-
term debt 
Cash 
holdings 
Return 
on assets 
Book-to-
market 
Negative 
B/M 
Momentum 
Raw Period Return 0.18                      
Abnormal Period Return 0.12  0.74                    
ln(Market cap) 0.54  0.08  0.05                  
Long-term debt 0.02  –0.01  –0.06  –0.08                
Short-term debt 0.02  –0.11  –0.09  0,00  –0.00              
Cash holdings –0.13  –0.00  0.10  –0.05  –0.26  –0.09            
Profitability –0.05  0.06  0.05  0,08  –0.15  –0.10  0.29          
Book-to-market 0.01  –0.15  –0.08  –0.08  0.01  0.07  –0.13  –0.18        
Negative B/M dummy 0.02  0.02  0.02  –0.04  0.40  0.09  0.00  0.16  –0.15      
Momentum 0.05  0.01  –0.24  0.21  –0.13  –0.07  0.05  0.09  –0.21  –0.09    
Idiosyncratic risk –0.31  –0.21  –0.04  –0.19  –0.01  –0.02  0.20  0.10  0.04  0.02  –0.11  
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3 Analysis and Findings 
I estimate various regressions of stock returns as a function of firms’ CSR variables and a number of 
control variables during the crisis period. The ultimate goal is to examine the effect of CSR on both raw period-
returns and abnormal crisis-period returns. To ensure that the effect of CSR is not due to variables correlating 
with CSR, I control for several variables considered to affect stock returns. In all regressions, I include sector 
dummies (classified by TRBC Economic Sector data) as some sectors may be more likely to invest in CSR 
than others. Moreover, some sectors suffered more than others during the crisis (Lins et al. 2016). I also include 
country dummies (based on country of exchange) due to fact that sample consists of firms from 19 countries 
and that some countries were hit more by crises than others (Berkmen, Gelos, Rennhack, and Walsh 2012). In 
addition, I control for the Carhart’s four factors (1997) by estimating the factor loadings over the 60-month 
period ending in July 2008. 
I employ several control variables to measure a firm’s financial health and other firm characteristics 
that have been shown to affect stock returns: Market Capitalization (log of market cap), Long-term debt (long-
term debt divided by assets), Short-term debt (short-term debt divided by assets), Cash holdings (cash and 
short-term investments divided by assets), Profitability (pretax income divided by assets), Book-to-market 
(book value of equity divided by market value of equity), Momentum (raw return over the preceding 12-month 
period), and Idiosyncratic risk (residual variance from the market model over the preceding 60-month period). 
Moreover, I introduce Negative B/M dummy for firms with negative shareholders’ equity as their returns are 
more likely to behave as of those with high book-to-market value and under financial distress (Fama and 
French 1992). 
To justify the chosen control variables, Fama and French (1992), and Daniel and Titman (1997) show 
that firm’s size and book-to-market ratio explain cross-sectional variation in stock returns. Carhart (1997) 
supplement the three-factor-model with fourth, momentum factor. Goyal and Santa-Clara (2003) find 
significant relation between average stock variance, especially idiosyncratic, and the market return. Duchin, 
Ozbas, and Sensoy (2010) and Harford, Klasa, and Maxwell (2014) argue that unprofitable firms with a little 
financial leeway were forced to cut their investment activities, especially if they had short-term debt maturing 
during the financial crisis. Thus, it is fair to assume these firms underperformed versus their peers with a better 
financial health. The regression model is formulated as follows: 
Returni,t = b0 + b1CSRi,2007 + Firm characteristics +  Four-factor loadings + Sector dummies +  Country 
dummies + ei,t 
 
 
 
 
 
12 
3.1 Baseline Results 
Results show that high-CSR firms yielded significantly higher returns compared to low-CSR firms 
during the financial crisis. Columns (A) and (B) in Table 4 indicate that a one-standard-deviation increase in 
CSR (0.209) increased raw crisis-period return and abnormal crisis-period return 3.02% (0.50% monthly) and 
3.84% (0.63% monthly), respectively.  
To ensure that the effect of CSR is not due to variables correlating with CSR, I introduce control 
variables in columns (C) and (D). Yet, the results still hold and remain significant, although the magnitude of 
CSR is somewhat weaker in terms of abnormal crisis-period return. A one-standard-deviation increase in CSR 
resulted in 3.11% (0.51% monthly) higher raw crisis-period return and 2.90% (0.48% monthly) higher 
abnormal crisis-period return. 
The results for control variables are in-line with existing literature as firms with better financial health 
suffered less during the crisis. Firms benefited from higher profitability and cash holdings and, 
correspondingly, suffered from higher debt ratios. To illustrate, a one-standard-deviation increase in 
profitability (0.113) and cash holdings (0.128) resulted in 1.88% and 1.78% increase in raw crisis-period 
return, respectively. Comparably, a one-standard-deviation increase in short-term debt (0.078) and long-term 
debt (0.184) resulted in –2.23% and –1.77% decrease in raw crisis-period return, respectively. Remarkably, 
the effect of control variables measuring financial health were consistently lower than CSR’s equivalent for 
both raw crisis-period return and abnormal crisis-period return, albeit combined effect of short-term debt and 
long-term debt was greater than CSR’s effect. 
Value factor (stocks with high book-to-market ratio) had negative effect on returns as well, which is 
in-line with previous studies suggesting investors move to growth stocks from value stocks in times of high 
volatility and uncertainty. Moreover, momentum and idiosyncratic risk had significant negative impact, 
especially on abnormal crisis-period return, while the effect of firm’s size was somewhat nonexistent. 
Next, I re-estimate the previous regressions but instead of using CSR as an explanatory variable, I 
divide firms into quartiles based on their CSR. I include dummy variables for the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th quartiles (Q2, 
Q3, and Q4) while the 1st quartile (Q1) serves as the reference category, of which effect is captured by constant 
(firms with the lowest CSR). Such setting allows to examine whether the effect of CSR on returns is more 
intense at some level of CSR activities than others. The regression model is formulated as follows: 
Returni,t = b0 + b1CSRQ2i,2007 + b2CSRQ3i,2007 + b3CSRQ4i,2007 + Firm characteristics +  Four-factor 
loadings + Sector dummies +  Country dummies + ei,t 
Columns (A) and (B) in Table 5 show that the positive effect of CSR increases together with its level. 
When moving from Q1 to Q2, Q3, and Q4, raw crisis-period return increases 1.55%, 5.92%, and 7.73%, 
respectively. For abnormal crisis-period return, the effect is even more significant, as returns increase 2.79%, 
7.79%, and 9.76% when moving from Q1 to Q2, Q3, and Q4, respectively. Distinctly, the intense of CSR leaps 
substantially between Q2 and Q3 and hence modestly from Q3 to Q4. 
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Table 4. CSR as an explanatory variable. 
Returni,t = b0 + b1CSRi,2007 + Firm characteristics +  Four-factor loadings + Sector dummies +  Country dummies + ei,t 
Linear regressions of crisis-period returns on CSR and control variables over the period from August 2008 to February 
2009. Columns (A) and (B) show the results for regressing CSR on Raw Period Return and Abnormal Period Return, 
respectively, while controlling four-factor loadings, sector dummies, and country dummies. In columns (C) and (D), I 
repeat the previous regressions but now add firm financial characteristics considered to affect returns. The estimate is 
presented in the first row. t-statistics is in parentheses in the second row. *, **, *** indicate the significance at the 10%, 
5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
Table 4 Raw return (A) Abn. Return (B) Raw return (C) Abn. Return (D) 
CSR 0.1443  0.1839  0.1489  0.1389  
  (2.912)*** (3.664)*** (2.499)** (2.305)** 
Ln(Market cap)     –0.0034  0.0088  
      (-0.293) (0.750) 
Long-term debt     –0.0960  –0.0735  
      (-1.527) (-1.155) 
Short-term debt     –0.2856  –0.2660  
      (-2.258)** (-2.078)** 
Cash holdings     0.1387  0.1541  
      (1.593) (1.749)* 
Profitability     0.1663  0.1136  
      (1.711)* (1.155) 
Book-to-market     –0.0470  –0.0286  
      (-2.084)** (-1.256) 
Negative B/M dummy     0.0308  0.0096  
      (0.298) (0.092) 
Momentum     –0.0969  –0.1418  
      (-1.938)* (-2.802)*** 
Idiosyncratic risk     –3.0751  –5.5976  
      (-1.265) (-2.275)** 
Constant –0.2688  –0.2134  –0.1773  –0.2004  
  (-4.287)*** (-3.361)*** (-1.598) (-1.786)* 
Four-factor loadings Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 516  516  516  516  
Adjusted R2 0.1973  0.1717  0.2286  0.2052  
 
As previously, I include control variables to remove the distortions of other firm characteristics. 
Columns (C) and (D) indicate that CSR affection on returns remains significant but slightly decreases when 
moving from Q3 to Q4 in terms of abnormal crisis-period return (1.86%, 6.50%, and 6.30%, for Q2, Q3, and 
Q4, respectively). To same extent, when moving from Q1 to Q2, Q3, and Q4, raw crisis-period return increases 
1.36%, 6.42%, and 7.18%, respectively. The results presented are equivocal as they clearly evidence the 
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positive effect of CSR during the financial crisis but, simultaneously, indicate that CSR’s effect on returns is 
non-linear and even turns negative after reaching certain point. These findings differ from those of Lins et al. 
(2016), who find that investors were most concerned when a firm had a low level of CSR and most reassured 
when CSR was at its highest level. 
To test whether the effect of CSR actually decreases after reaching point of sufficient trust, I further 
divide firms into deciles to examine margin effects on returns. However, Figure 1 implies that positive trend 
exists from the first decile to the last, although some inconsistently after the 8th decile. Accordingly, it appears 
that investors where most convinced when the level of CSR was high but decelerating increase in returns 
signals to diminishing marginal utility of CSR activities. 
Figure 1. CSR deciles as explanatory variables. 
Linear regression of crisis-period returns on CSR deciles over the period from August 2008 to February 2009. Firms are 
divided into deciles based on their CSR. I control for firm financial characteristics, four-factor loadings, sector dummies, 
and country dummies. 
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Table 5. CSR quartiles as explanatory variables. 
Returni,t = b0 + b1CSRQ2i,2007 + b2CSRQ3i,2007 + b3CSRQ4i,2007 + Firm characteristics +  Four-factor loadings + Sector 
dummies +  Country dummies + ei,t 
Linear regressions of crisis-period returns on CSR quartiles over the period from August 2008 to February 2009. Firms 
are divided into quartiles based on their CSR by including dummy variables for the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th quartiles. The 1st 
quartile serves as a reference category. Columns (A) and (B) show the results for regressing CSR quartiles on Raw Period 
Return and Abnormal Period Return, respectively, while controlling for four-factor loadings, sector dummies, and country 
dummies. In columns (C) and (D), I repeat the previous regressions but now add firm financial characteristics considered 
to affect returns. The estimate is presented in the first row. t-statistics is in parentheses in the second row. *, **, *** 
indicate the significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
Table 5 Raw return (A) Abn. Return (B) Raw return (C) Abn. Return (D) 
CSR Q2 0,0155  0,0279  0,0136  0,0186  
  (0.553) (0.981) (0.475) (0.642) 
CSR Q3 0,0592  0,0779  0,0642  0,0650  
  (2.094)** (2.720)*** (2.145)** (2.144)** 
CSR Q4 0,0773  0,0976  0,0718  0,0630  
  (2.651)*** (3.301)*** (2.100)** (1.822)* 
Ln(Market cap)     –0,0019  0,0112  
      (-0.166) (0.970) 
Long-term debt     –0,1018  –0,0818  
      (-1.599) (-1.270) 
Short-term debt     –0,2841  –0,2671  
      (-2.238)** (-2.080)** 
Cash holdings     0,1265  0,1443  
      (1.446) (1.630) 
Profitability     0,1680  0,1122  
      (1.716)* (1.133) 
Book-to-market     –0,0475  –0,0289  
      (-2.104)** (-1.264) 
Negative B/M dummy     0,0439  0,0234  
      (0.421) (0.222) 
Momentum     –0,0980  –0,1444  
      (-1.951)* (-2.840)*** 
Idiosyncratic risk     –3,0200  –5,4701  
      (-1.224) (-2.190)** 
Constant –0,2208  –0,1553  –0,1377  –0,1750  
  (-3.827)*** (-2.658)*** (-1.175) (-1.475) 
Four-factor loadings Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 516  516  516  516  
Adjusted R2 0,1951  0,1687  0,2263  0,2025  
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3.2 Different Elements of CSR and Returns 
Since aggregate CSR inevitably affects crisis-period returns, I am interested if only certain elements 
of CSR are essential for returns. Lins et al. (2016) argue that a firm can build its social capital through a variety 
of activities and that such activities can enhance the trust of all of a firm’s stakeholders. However, it is likely 
that high-CSR firms enter some activities more often than others, and that some activities are apt to building 
trust and thus higher valued by stakeholders at time of uncertainty. 
To examine this, I compare effects of different elements in two different settings. First, I disaggregate 
CSR into two elements: those that stand for environmental factors (Resource Use and Emissions) and those 
that stand for social factors (Workforce, Human Rights, and Community). For the second setting, I divide CSR 
into two elements: those that influence primarily internal stakeholders (Workforce) and those that influence 
primarily external stakeholders (Resource Use, Emissions, Human Rights, and Community). To form these 
elements, I apply the same methodology as for CSR variable and thus exploit the same category weights 
defined in Table 1. Moreover, I control the same firm characteristics as in prior regressions. The regression 
model is formulated as follows: 
Returni,t = b0 + b1Element1i,2007 + b2Element2i,2007 + Firm characteristics +  Four-factor loadings + Sector 
dummies +  Country dummies + ei,t 
Results in Table 6 indicate a clear distinction between two elements in both settings. Columns (A) and 
(B) show that a one-standard-deviation increase in environmental (0.254) and social (0.214) factors resulted 
in 3.13% and 0.11% higher abnormal crisis-period returns, respectively. Correspondingly, columns (C) and 
(D) indicate that a one-standard-deviation increase in internal (0.263) and external (0.218) stakeholder 
activities is associated with 0.28% and 2.93% higher abnormal crisis-period returns, respectively. As a 
consequence, the findings suggest that external stakeholder activities targeted to environmental issues were 
seen as the most essential aspects to build trust and create shareholder value. 
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Table 6. Different elements of CSR as explanatory variables. 
Returni,t = b0 + b1Element1i,2007 + b2Element2i,2007 + Firm characteristics +  Four-factor loadings + Sector dummies +  
Country dummies + ei,t 
Linear regressions for two different settings of crisis-period returns on different elements of CSR over the period from 
August 2008 to February 2009. In the first setting, CSR is divided into two elements: Environmental activities and Social 
activities. Columns (A) and (B) show the results for the first setting regressing Environmental and Social activities on 
Raw Period Return and Abnormal Period Return, respectively, while controlling for firm financial characteristics, four-
factor loadings, sector dummies, and country dummies. In the second setting, CSR is divided into two elements: Internal 
stakeholder activities and External stakeholder activities. Columns (C) and (D), show the results for the second setting 
regressing Internal and External activities on Raw Period Return and Abnormal Period Return, respectively, while 
controlling for the same variables as in prior columns. The estimate is presented in the first row. t-statistics is in 
parentheses in the second row. *, **, *** indicate the significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
Table 6 Raw return (A) Abn. Return (B) Raw return (C) Abn. Return (D) 
Environmental 0.1231  0.1230      
  (2.293)** (2.264)**     
Social 0.0158  0.0052      
  (0.246) (0.080)     
Internal     0.0293  0.0106  
      (0.625) (0.224) 
External     0.1230  0.1346  
      (1.880)* (2.035)** 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Four-factor loadings Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 516  516  516  516  
Adjusted R2 0.2294 0.2064 0.2273 0.2045 
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3.3 Regional Trust, CSR and Returns 
Putnam (2000) argues that one’s social capital is more valuable in a society where overall social capital 
is higher, creating hypothesis in this context that value of CSR activities is greater in countries of a higher level 
of trust. 
I obtain data on regional variation in trust from Eurobarometer (Standard EB 69, 2008) conducted by 
the European Commission’s Directorate General Communication during the period from March 2008 to May 
2008, which was only a few months before the onset of the crisis. According to the European Parliament, the 
barometer consists of a series of public opinion surveys covering a wide range of issues focusing mainly on 
citizens’ perceptions and expectations published semi-annually since 1973. The barometer also comprises 
specific surveys measuring trust towards the European Union and national institutions of the 27 EU member 
states, including a survey that asks: “I would like to ask you a question about how much trust you have in 
certain institution (national justice / the legal system). Please tell me if you tend to trust it or tend not to trust 
it.” The survey consists of over 30,000 interviews with an average of 48% trusting their national justice or the 
legal system. Clearly, there is substantial variation in trust between different countries when only 32% of the 
interviewees in Italy trusted their justice system compared to 84% in Finland. Generally, the level of trust is 
higher in the Nordic and Central European countries while being lower in Southern European countries. The 
main limitation of the data is the fact it covers only EU member states thus omitting three of nineteen countries 
in the original sample. To address the problem, I exclude firms located in the missing countries (Norway, 
Russia, and Switzerland) in further regressions, which reduces the sample from 516 to 462 observations. 
To test the hypothesis, I repeat the prior analyses but now allow the effect of CSR on returns to vary 
depending on whether the firm locates in a high- or low-trust region by including an interaction term in the 
regression model. I apply a dummy variable to mark whether the firm’s country of exchange locates in high-
trust region. However, the concept of high-trust region is indefinite and thus it is impossible to point out 
delicately which amount of trust is required to qualify this definition. Therefore, I run a series of regressions 
with each a different constraint that separates the country from high- or low-trust region by exploiting different 
high-trust region dummy variables. To illustrate, I apply four different dummy variables in four otherwise 
identical tests with limits of ≥ 66%, ≥ 59%, ≥ 55%, and ≥ 48% trust in justice system to qualify in high-trust 
region. This allows me to examine whether the inflation of high-trust dummy affects the power of CSR and 
hence reveals whether there is a relationship among overall trust in a region, CSR and crisis-period returns. 
The regression model is formulated as follows: 
Returni,t = b0 + b1CSRi,2007 + b2High-trust regioni,2008 + b3(CSRi,2007 × High-trust regioni,2008) + Firm 
characteristics +  Four-factor loadings + Sector dummies + Country dummies + ei,t, 
The results in Table 7 show that crisis-period returns are increasingly affected by CSR in high-trust 
region and that the interaction effect exists. There is also a clear pattern in the effect of CSR on crisis-period 
returns when the amount of trust required to qualify in high-trust region varies. In other words, by applying 
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the smallest group of countries with the highest level of trust to represent high-trust region, the interaction 
effect is at its greatest. Moreover, the effect of CSR in low-trust region is consistently insignificant, especially 
on abnormal crisis-period returns. To illustrate the findings for raw crisis-period returns, by applying limit of 
≥ 66% trust in justice system to separate high- and low-trust regions, a one-standard-deviation increase in CSR 
is associated with excess returns of 2.45% (0.40% monthly) in low-trust regions, but up to 5.54% (0.90% 
monthly) in high-trust regions. By applying the same limit of trust for abnormal crisis-period returns, the 
distinction is even more significant: a one-standard-deviation increase in CSR resulted in excess returns of 
1.77% (0.29% monthly) in low-trust regions, but 7.06% (1.14% monthly) in high-trust regions. 
The findings in this section suggest a strong link between the overall trust in a society, firm’s CSR 
activities, and excess crisis-period returns. They are in-line with Putnam’s (2000) argument that building social 
capital is more valuable in a society where overall trust is higher as high-CSR firms had outstanding excess 
returns in high-trust regions, but only minor in low-trust regions. Similarly, Lins et al. (2016) find equivalent 
results, but distinction between high- and low-trust regions was considerably slighter in the U.S market, 
implying that Europe is much more heterogeneous area in terms of regional trust. 
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Table 7. Interaction effect of CSR and regional trust on crisis-period returns. 
Returni,t = b0 + b1CSRi,2007 + b2High-trust regioni,2008 + b3(CSRi,2007 × High-trust regioni,2008) + Firm characteristics +  Four-factor loadings + Sector dummies + Country dummies + eit 
Linear regressions of crisis-period returns on CSR and regional trust over the period from August 2008 to February 2009. Countries are divided into either high- or low-trust 
region based on their citizens’ trust in national justice / the legal system according to Standard Eurobarometer (2008). I have applied four different limits to separate high- and 
low-trust regions. Columns (A) and (B) show the results for limit of ≥ 66%, columns (C) and (D) for limit of ≥ 59%, columns (E) and (F) for limit of ≥ 55%, and columns (G) 
and (H) for limit of ≥ 48%. CSR × High-trust region expresses the interaction effect of CSR and high-trust region on crisis-period returns on conditional High-trust region 
dummy = 1. CSR × Low-trust region expresses the effect of CSR on crisis-period returns on conditional High-trust region dummy = 0. In all regressions, I control for firm 
financial characters, four-factor loadings, sector dummies, and country dummies. The estimate is presented in the first row. t-statistics is in parentheses in the second row. *, 
**, *** indicate the significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
  Trust in justice system ≥ 66% Trust in justice system ≥ 59% Trust in justice system ≥ 55% Trust in justice system ≥ 48% 
Table 7 Raw return (A) Abn. Return (B) Raw return (C) Abn. Return (D) Raw return (E) Abn. Return (F) Raw return (G) Abn. Return (H) 
CSR × High-trust region 0.2650  0.3377  0.2250  0.2840  0.1711  0.1844  0.1490  0.1521  
  (3.024)*** (3.362)*** (2.752)*** (3.068)*** (1.991)** (2.021)** (1.322) (1.301) 
CSR × Low-trust region 0.1172  0.0847  0.1169  0.0779  0.1192  0.0784  0.1488  0.0875  
  (1.804)* (1.293) (1.735)* (1.146) (1.460) (0.949) (1.321) (0.768) 
Firm characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Four-factor loadings Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sector dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 462  462  462  462  462  462  462  462  
No. firms in high-trust 104  104  152  152  319  319  423  423  
No. Firms in low-trust 358  358  310  310  143  143  39  39  
Adjusted R2 0.2294 0.2107 0.2287 0.2097 0.2275 0.2055 0.2270 0.2040 
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3.4 Industry Trust, CSR and Returns 
Similar to previous section, I examine whether the effect of CSR on crisis-period returns is conditional 
on industry trust, i.e. how trustworthy people perceive certain industries. 
I obtain data on industrial variation in trust from Edelman Trust Barometer (2008) produced by 
Edelman Intelligence during 2007-2008. The barometer is a global survey measuring trust and credibility in 
institutions such as non-governmental organizations, firms, and government. A survey that measures trust of 
informed publics in different industry sectors conducted in 18 countries asks: “Please tell me how much you 
trust businesses in each of the following industries to do what is right. Please use a nine-point scale where one 
means that ‘you do not trust them at all’ and nine means that you ‘trust them a great deal’”. Again, there is a 
considerable variation on how trustworthy respondents perceive different industries as technology scored 77% 
in the survey compared to 46% scored by media companies. 
To test the conjecture, I apply the same methodology as in previous section. I include a similar 
interaction term in the regression model to test the interaction effect of high- and low-trust industries on CSR 
and crisis-period returns. I apply a dummy variable to reflect whether the firm operates in a high-trust industry. 
Likewise, I conduct two otherwise identical tests, but with different dummy variables that represent different 
acceptable levels (≥ 59% and ≥ 57%) of trust in separation of high- and low-trust industries, responding to the 
indefinite nature issue. The regression model is formulated as follows: 
Returni,t = b0 + b1CSRi,2007 + b2High-trust industryi,2008 + b3(CSRi,2007 × High-trust industryi,2008) + Firm 
characteristics +  Four-factor loadings + Sector dummies + Country dummies + ei,t 
The results in Table 8 indicate that crisis-period returns are more affected by CSR in trustworthy 
industries. Moreover, the interaction effect increases by raising the acceptable level of trust in industries to 
qualify in high-trust category, which supports the implication that CSR activities are more valuable in 
trustworthy industries. For raw crisis-period returns, by applying limit of ≥ 59% industry trust to divide high- 
and low-trust industries, a one-standard-deviation increase in CSR is associated with excess returns of 2.29% 
(0.38% monthly) in low-trust industries, but up to 6.59% (1.07% monthly) in high-trust industries. By applying 
the same limit of trust for abnormal crisis-period returns, the interaction effect is slightly lower: a one-standard-
deviation increase in CSR is associated with excess returns of 2.29% (0.38% monthly) in low-trust industries, 
but 5.43% (0.89% monthly) in high-trust industries. The findings are very similar to those found in regional 
differences in trust and provide additional supporting evidence from interaction effect of trust and CSR on 
crisis-period returns. 
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Table 8. Interaction effect of CSR and industry trust on crisis-period returns. 
Returni,t = b0 + b1CSRi,2007 + b2High-trust industryi,2008 + b3(CSRi,2007 × High-trust industryi,2008) + Firm characteristics 
+  Four-factor loadings + Sector dummies + Country dummies + ei,t 
Linear regressions of crisis-period returns on CSR and industry trust over the period from August 2008 to February 2009. 
Industries are divided into either high- or low-trust industry based on informed publics’ trust in each industry according 
to Edelman Trust Barometer (2008). I have applied two different limits to separate high- and low-trust industries. Columns 
(A) and (B) show the results for limit of ≥ 59% and columns (C) and (D) for limit of ≥ 57%. CSR × High-trust industry 
expresses the interaction effect of CSR and high-trust industry on crisis-period returns on conditional High-trust industry 
dummy = 1. CSR × Low-trust industry expresses the effect of CSR on crisis-period returns on conditional High-trust 
industry dummy = 0. In all regressions, I control for firm financial characters, four-factor loadings, sector dummies, and 
country dummies. The estimate is presented in the first row. t-statistics is in parentheses in the second row. *, **, *** 
indicate the significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 Industry trust ≥ 59% Industry trust ≥ 57% 
Table 8 Raw return (A) Abn. Return (B) Raw return (C) Abn. Return (D) 
CSR × High-trust industry 0.3154  0.2598  0.2821  0.1743  
  (3.577)*** (3.037)*** (3.328)*** (2.369)** 
CSR × Low-trust industry 0.1097  0.1095  0.1029  0.1255  
  (1.734)* (1.709)* (1.580) (1.900)* 
Firm characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Four-factor loadings Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sector dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 516  516  516  516  
No. firms in high-trust ind. 104  104  149  149  
No. firms in low-trust ind. 412  412  367  367  
Adjusted R2 0.2309 0.2050 0.2304 0.2024 
 
3.5 Robustness Tests 
I conduct a series of robustness tests to check whether the findings are robust after several adjustments 
to regression model inputs. First, I test robustness of the results by changing measurement time of CSR, to see 
whether the variable is persistent over the short-term period. In the baseline results, CSR and other variables 
are measured at the end of 2007, which was the preceding year the financial crisis escalated. However, stocks 
had already declined in Europe during that year, after having peaked in July 2007. Therefore, it is possible that 
some firms anticipated the upcoming market turmoil and began adjusting their CSR activities accordingly.  
To test this, I measure CSR at the end of 2006, at which time firms were presumably free of concerns 
and unable to predict the difficulties ahead. It is also possible that CSR is just an element of excess investment 
for well-performing firms before the crisis. Hence, these firms were forced to cut their excesses and abandon 
their operations that had negative net present value resulting in better performance than their peers during the 
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crisis. To address this concern, I also measure CSR at the heart of the crisis, as of year-end 2008, when those 
firms of excess investment had arguably cut their CSR activities. Table 9 shows that findings are robust and 
remain significant. Apparently, the baseline results are set between CSR measures from 2006 and 2008. In 
other words, the effect of CSR intensifies when the measurement date approaches the crisis period. 
Table 9. Robustness tests on different measurement dates of CSR. 
Linear regressions of crisis-period returns on CSR over the period from August 2008 to February 2009. Columns (A) and 
(B) show the results for regressing CSR measured in 2006 on Raw Period Return and Abnormal Period Return, 
respectively, while controlling for firm financial characteristics, four-factor loadings, sector dummies, and country 
dummies. Columns (C) and (D) show the results for regressing CSR measured in 2008 on Raw Period Return and 
Abnormal Period Return, respectively, while controlling for the same variables as in prior columns. The estimate is 
presented in the first row. t-statistics is in parentheses in the second row. *, **, *** indicate the significance at the 10%, 
5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
  CSR 2006 CSR 2008 
 Table 9 Raw return (A) Abn. Return (B) Raw return (C) Abn. Return (D) 
CSR 0.1315  0.1202  0.1740  0.1631  
  (2.079)** (1.852)* (2.878)*** (2.603)*** 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Four-factor loadings Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 430  430  457  457  
Adjusted R2 0.2428 0.1853 0.2676 0.2242 
 
Second, I test whether the results are dependent on selected time period for the financial crisis. I 
excluded March 2009 as part of the crisis period as February 2009 was the month when STOXX Europe 600 
saw its lowest monthly close price. However, stocks continued to decline in the beginning of March, reaching 
their crisis lows, but strongly recovered ever since. However, despite of including March 2009, results in Table 
10 show that findings remain significant although slightly weaker, which is presumably due to risen overall 
trust reflected by increased stock returns and market optimism. 
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Table 10. Robustness test on alternative crisis-period. 
Linear regressions of crisis-period returns on CSR over the period from August 2008 to March 2009. Columns (A) and 
(B) show the results for regressing CSR on Raw Period Return and Abnormal Period Return, respectively, while 
controlling for firm financial characteristics, four-factor loadings, sector dummies, and country dummies. The estimate is 
presented in the first row. t-statistics is in parentheses in the second row. *, **, *** indicate the significance at the 10%, 
5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
          March 2009 included 
 Table 10 Raw return (A) Abn. Return (B) 
CSR 0.1185  0.1187  
  (1.964)** (1.897)* 
Control variables Yes Yes 
Four-factor loadings Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes 
Country dummies Yes Yes 
N 516  516  
Adjusted R2 0.1854  0.1955  
 
Third, I test whether inclusion of governance variable affects the results, as some recent studies have 
shown that well-governed firms outperformed their peers during the financial crisis (Lins et al. 2013; and 
Nguyen et al. 2015). If CSR was correlating with governance, it could be simply proxying the effect of 
governance, resulting in omitted variable bias. To test this, I control governance by using the same ESG data 
provided by Refinitiv. I apply Governance Pillar Score to proxy the quality of each firm’s governance and 
scale it to range from 0 to 1 as CSR does. Governance Pillar is one of three pillars constituting overall ESG, 
and it is formed by three categories: management, shareholders, and CSR strategy. As other ESG categories, 
each governance category is weighted by the number of indicators that constitute each category. Management 
stands for the largest category with a weight of 63%, while shareholders and CSR strategy have weights of 
22% and 15%, respectively. To test the hypothesis, I repeat the baseline regressions, but this time include 
governance as another explanatory variable along with CSR. 
Similar to results in Aebi, Sabato, and Schmid (2012) and Lins et al. (2016), columns (A) and (B) in 
Table 11 show that governance has no significant effect on returns as an explanatory variable, while the 
positive effect of CSR slightly increases compared to baseline results in Table 4. 
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Table 11. Robustness tests. Controlling for Governance & R&D investments. 
Linear regressions of crisis-period returns on CSR over the period from August 2008 to February 2009. Columns (A) and 
(B) show the results for regressing CSR and Governance on Raw Period Return and Abnormal Period Return, 
respectively, while controlling for firm financial characteristics, four-factor loadings, sector dummies, and country 
dummies. Columns (C) and (D) show the results for regressing CSR and R&D investments on Raw Period Return and 
Abnormal Period Return, respectively, while controlling for the same variables as in prior columns. The estimate is 
presented in the first row. t-statistics is in parentheses in the second row. *, **, *** indicate the significance at the 10%, 
5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
Table 11 Raw return (A) Abn. Return (B) Raw return (C) Abn. Return (D) 
CSR 0.1586  0.1537  0.2433  0.1955 
  (2.566)** (2.457)** (2.847)*** (2.401)** 
Governance –0.0304  –0.0460      
  (-0.594) (-0.889)     
R&D investment     0.5311  0.7756  
      (1.483) (2.273)** 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Four-factor loadings Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 516  516  229  229  
Adjusted R2 0.2276  0.2049  0.2969 0.2182 
 
As a final robustness test, I check whether the results are robust to controlling for investment in R&D. 
McWilliams and Siegel (2000) argue that regression models excluding R&D expenses are misspecified and 
result in upwardly biased estimates of the financial impact of CSR and inclusion of such costs neutralizes the 
effect of CSR. Padgett and Galán (2010) study the effect of R&D intensity on CSR and find that R&D intensity 
positively affects CSR. They argue that the relationship is significant in manufacturing industries whereas 
insignificant in non-manufacturing industries. To construct R&D investment variable for each firm, I retrieve 
R&D expenses for the financial year 2007 and divide it by total assets measured at the end of 2007. However, 
such data is available for less than half of the firms in the original sample, which limits the number of 
observations to 229 in this test, reducing the comparability of results. As previously, I repeat the baseline 
regressions, but this time include investment in R&D as another explanatory variable along with CSR. 
Columns (C) and (D) in Table 11 show that the results are robust, yet investment in R&D positively 
affects returns and has significant effect on abnormal crisis-period return. It is also worth noting that adjusted 
R2 of the regression model increases compared to baseline results, especially in terms of raw crisis-period 
return, which is in-line with the argument of McWilliams and Siegel (2000) that investment in R&D should 
be included in regression models including CSR. However, this may be a consequence of reduced sample size 
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as well. Overall, both CSR and R&D investment seem to explain crisis-period returns, although the effect of 
R&D investment is at most indicative and calls for further examination in this context. 
 
4 Discussion 
The outperformance of high-CSR firms during the financial crisis supports the view that CSR activities 
offer protection from an economic shock. Albuquerque et al. (2019) find that CSR activities decrease firm’s 
systematic risk. In other words, high-CSR firms suffered less since they are less exposed to market risk, which 
explains greater raw crisis-period returns compared to other firms. If this was only the case, those firms should 
also have zero abnormal crisis-period returns, as the lower systematic risk would have been predicted by the 
market model. Therefore, high-CSR firms appear to carry less idiosyncratic risk as well whether this is due to 
increased trustworthiness or some other unidentified factor. However, a number of tests presented in this paper 
supported with existing literature suggest that firms’ CSR activities are apt to building social capital and trust 
that benefits at times when overall trust declines, as happened during the financial crisis. 
Trust-building effect of CSR activities seem to be two-parted, when the first benefit comes from an 
operational improvement. Albuquerque et al. (2019) model CSR activities through customer loyalty and argue 
that superior CSR goods consumed by wealthy customers have more stable demand across the economic cycle. 
Similarly, Lins et al. (2016) suggest that customer loyalty is one of the channels through which high-CSR 
firms gained operatively during the crisis but base their argument on the reciprocity concept. Moreover, by 
applying the same reciprocity concept, they suggest that employee and investor channels also helped high-
CSR firms during the crisis, through increased efficiency (measured as sales per employee) and debt capital 
raising. 
The second part relates to more abstract concept reflected in a valuation premium that investors 
arguably place on high-CSR firms at time of negative economic shock. This phenomenon is strongly linked to 
firms’ social capital and trust in the literature, as the excess returns cannot be explained by increased figures 
as in operational improvement. Guiso et al. (2008) argue that “the decision to invest in stocks requires … also 
an act of faith that the data in our possession are reliable and that the overall system is fair”, which most of 
time, investors and other stakeholders supposedly take as granted. However, the financial crisis was a severe 
systemic crisis that shook the people’s trust in fundamental institutions, observed in a sharp decline of overall 
confidence (Roth, 2009). For instance, for the first time since the creation of the European Central Bank, 
majority of European citizens no longer trusted in it (Standard Eurobarometer 71, 2009). Therefore, if the 
assessment of financial data reliability and overall system fairness moved closer towards the central decision-
making, investors likely prefer trustworthy seen high-CSR firms that have built their social capital and trust 
through various CSR activities. 
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The findings presented in this paper are consistent in many ways with those of Lins et al. (2016) with 
the exception of a few circumstances. The magnitude of CSR variable on crisis-period returns is similar in 
both geographical areas, although I find that the difference between the 3rd and the 4th quartiles (quartiles of 
high-CSR firms) is only minor or even nonexistent, which contradicts with the findings of their study. 
However, I find that the major benefit of CSR activities arises between the 2nd and the 3rd quartiles, with 
roughly 5% increase in crisis-period excess returns. 
As Lins et al. (2016), I show that regional trust is strongly related to firm’s CSR activities and excess 
crisis-period returns. The relationship of those three factors appears to be even stronger in Europe, as high-
CSR firms yielded outstanding 1.14% monthly abnormal returns in high-trust regions, but only minor (0.29% 
monthly) in low-trust regions during the crisis-period. I argue that the increased interaction effect of regional 
trust on CSR activities is due to heterogeneous nature of Europe, which emphasizes the regional differences 
in trust and thus the power of CSR activities across the continent. More practical approach would suggest that 
firms in the Nordic and Central European countries (in this study: Finland, Denmark, Sweden, Austria, 
Netherlands, and Germany) should enter in CSR activities, but also accept lower cost of equity in high-CSR 
investments and projects, as they reduce firms’ risk profile in the countries where the overall trust in justice, 
legal system, and fundamental institutions is greater. To same extent, firms in Southern Europe countries or 
other low-trust regions (e.g. GIIPS countries) should not have the same incentives to enter in CSR activities 
as the added (economic) value of such activities is indifferent. 
I also find evidence that the same implication applies to trustworthy industries. High-CSR firms 
operating in such industries (e.g. technology, health care, and retail) produced substantial 0.89% monthly 
abnormal returns, but only 0.38% monthly abnormal returns in more unreliable industries (e.g. media, 
entertainment, and CPG manufacturing). By approaching the topic from an aspect of controversial industries, 
Palazzo and Richter (2005) study CSR engagement in the tobacco industry and find that CSR is based upon a 
much thinner approach. This is because mainstream aspects of CSR (e.g. philanthropy and stakeholder 
collaboration) are non- or even counterproductive in the tobacco industry due to deep distrust towards the 
industry. Nevertheless, Jo and Na (2012) find that firm’s CSR engagement actually reduces risk more 
effectively in controversial industries. Thus, above findings suggest that the difference between high- and low-
trust industries is not due to CSR’s risk reduction effect, but in a way how firms approach CSR engagement in 
different industries. In other words, firms in trusted industries assimilate CSR in a broader manner, which is 
arguably seen as more trustworthy among stakeholders. 
Yet, probably the biggest contradiction between the results of this paper and those of Lins et al. (2016) 
is the one from the different elements of CSR and their effects on crisis-period returns. They find evidence that 
both internal and external stakeholder activities have significant effect on crisis-period returns and suggest that 
both activities were seen as valuable by investors. Comparably, my findings suggest that only external 
stakeholder activities targeted to environmental issues have significant effect on crisis-period returns. The 
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difference may be a consequence of different data sources and different methodology applied in ESG scores 
calculation by data providers as well (MSCI vs. Refinitiv).  
However, there is also an ongoing debate in the literature as to whether, especially, environmental or 
social elements are value-creating elements. Similar to my findings, (e.g. Hart, 1995; Russo and Fouts, 1997) 
argue that outstanding presence in environmental activities combined to its effective communication to 
external stakeholders could reinforce and differentiate a firm’s reputation. Cormier and Magnan (2013) find 
that reliable and relevant environmental disclosures enhance firm’s legitimacy but also help analysts conduct 
more accurate earnings forecasts. Consequently, the findings suggest that environmental activities, which also 
belong to external stakeholder activities, appear to increase firm’s transparency that may be viewed as greater 
trustworthiness at time of uncertainty. Furthermore, findings of Cormier and Magnan (2013) indicate that 
environmental activities help communicating firm’s intrinsic value reflected in better analyst forecasts, that 
may act as counterreaction in a stock market crash as investors tend to overreact to unexpected and dramatic 
news (De Bondt and Thaler, 1985). 
Correspondingly, social activities are mostly linked to improvement in operational performance, 
which I relate to the first part of CSR’s trust-building benefits in this paper. Similar to prior arguments of 
channels through which high-CSR firms gained operatively, Qui, Shaukat, and Tharyan (2015) argue that 
advantages gained through social disclosures “can manifest in the form of enhanced ability of the firm to attract 
and retain higher quality human capital, higher customer and supplier loyalty, and increased firm sales.”, which 
is exactly what Lins et al. (2016) suggest and find in their study. Perhaps, the European high-CSR firms did 
not experience similar improvement in operative performance, which would explain the differences in results. 
If this was the case, the excess returns gained by high-CSR firms would be exclusively due to the second part 
of CSR benefits gained through environmental activities and reflected in a valuation premium that investors 
place on high-CSR firms during the crisis. However, as a caveat, this is only speculation since the analysis of 
operational improvements is outside of the focus in this study. Finally, it is also possible that current metrics 
measuring social activities fail to capture its effect as such activities are more hard-to-measure compared to 
environmental activities. 
Despite of the protection CSR evidently provides from a crisis of trust, it unfortunately does not offer 
a shortcut to success as general investment strategy. A number of studies have shown that socially responsible 
investing (SRI) has insignificant effect on portfolio returns (e.g. Galema, Plantinga, and Scholtens, 2008) or is 
even related to negative risk-adjusted returns (e.g. Renneboog, Ter Horst, and Zhang, 2008). Hypothetically 
speaking, if the returns of high-CSR stocks were solely dependent on the level of trust, all else being equal, 
the only possible outcome after a crisis of trust would be negative excess returns assuming that there is an 
inverse relationship and the level of trust recovers. Moreover, CSR activities appear not to provide protection 
from all the economic crises. Lins et al. (2016) show that high-CSR firms had significant excess returns during 
the Enron crisis of 2001-2003 surrounded by accounting scandals but find no evidence of excess returns during 
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a shock to the supply of credit of 2007-2008. They argue that the shock to the supply of credit was not a crisis 
of trust supported by Edelman Trust Barometer, which showed no decline in confidence during the crisis. 
After all, this study is not without limitations. First, due to lack of historical data, I manage to gather 
a sample of 516 firms which obviously covers only a fraction of European public firms at time of the financial 
crisis. This is mostly due to a circumstance that ESG data is only available for larger firms, e.g. Refinitiv 
provides ESG data for one-quarter of over 2,000 firms with market cap of over $250 million. Therefore, my 
sample is biased to represent only larger firms in the economy, and it is possible that the findings do not apply 
for SMEs as well. Second, although I control for many factors considered to affect returns, it is always possible 
that CSR is correlated with some other unidentified variable being attributable to some other factor instead of 
social capital and trust. Third, the measures for calculating ESG scores are always subjective, due to abstract 
nature of concepts it includes, meaning that modifying the methodology could result in different ESG scores 
and results in this paper. Fourth, in this study, CSR is set to proxy the effect of social capital and trust. Thus, 
it is possible that the effect of CSR is not based upon the concepts discussed in this paper, but some other 
concepts outside of the scope of this study. Finally, the financial crisis was probably a once-in-a-generation 
event due to its exceptionally severe nature. Therefore, it is possible that the findings presented in this study 
cannot be generalized for other historical events or similar crises in the future. Nonetheless, the fact that my 
findings hold after controlling for numerous firm’s financial characteristics, other factors related to stock 
returns, sector, country, and a number of robustness tests, provides strong support for robustness of the results. 
 
5 Conclusion 
The findings summarized in this paper indicate that high-CSR firms enjoyed 6-7% higher excess 
returns compared to low-CSR firms in Europe during the financial crisis of 2008-2009. I also show that 
regional and industry trust are strongly positively related to firm’s CSR activities and excess crisis-period 
returns, and that the effectiveness of CSR activities on excess returns varies substantially across the Europe 
and industries. Existing literature points out that CSR activities not only help firms reduce their systematic and 
idiosyncratic risk but build social capital and trust that benefits when the overall trust suddenly declines. Thus, 
CSR activities serve as if an insurance policy for the firms as prior studies have also shown (e.g. Lins et al. 
2016). Assumptions and propositions presented in this paper rely strongly on that conjecture of built social 
capital and trust through CSR activities. 
Moreover, I find that not all the elements of CSR offer protection from an economic shock, which 
contradicts with previous findings (e.g. Lins et al. 2016). I suggest that environmental activities effectively 
communicated to external stakeholders were most appreciated by investors during the crisis, while internal 
stakeholder and social activities of CSR had no effect on crisis-period returns. Prior studies (e.g. Cormier and 
Magnan, 2013) suggest that environmental activities particularly increase firm’s external reputation and 
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transparency that could be viewed as greater trustworthiness at time of uncertainty, but also effectively 
communicated intrinsic value. 
My findings combined with existing literature have many practical implications as well. From the 
firm’s perspective, given the lower systematic and idiosyncratic risk, investments that increase firm’s CSR 
should be discounted with lower cost of equity (Albuquerque et al. 2019). I extend this by suggesting that firms 
in high-trust regions (e.g. the Nordic and Central European countries) and operating in trustworthy industries 
(e.g. technology and healthcare) should accept lower cost of equity in high-CSR investments and projects than 
their counterparts. From the investor’s perspective, given the same assumptions of lower beta and idiosyncratic 
risk, investors should accept lower required rate of return for high-CSR firms and consider firm’s CSR 
activities in the choice of stocks to include in a portfolio (Albuquerque et al. 2019). I further extend this by 
arguing that investors should also take into account firm’s geographical location and industry, but also the 
nature of CSR activities when considering the value of firm’s CSR activities. High-CSR firms in such regions 
and industries could also be used for hedging one’s portfolio. 
Overall, these findings contribute to current CSR literature that broadens the focus beyond traditional 
explanatory variables on stock returns, to social capital and overall trust, especially at time of crisis when trust 
in most needed. The main implication from the results is that CSR serves as an insurance policy for negative 
events. Prior findings and the ones presented in this paper also imply that the trust-building effect of CSR seem 
to be two-parted during a crisis of trust: it helps firms perform operatively better and is associated with a 
valuation premium investors place for firms involved in such activities. However, since I only focus on the 
financial crisis, which was an exceptionally severe systemic crisis and probably a once-in-a-generation event, 
it is uncertain if my results hold in other crises of trust. Therefore, it opens opportunities for future research, 
as well as the contribution of different parts of CSR on returns. 
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